University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1996

Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO
Medical Malpractice Claims: A Response to
PacifiCare of Oklahoma v. Burrage
Seema R. Shah

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Shah, Seema R., "Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical Malpractice Claims: A Response to PacifiCare of Oklahoma
v. Burrage" (1996). Minnesota Law Review. 2316.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2316

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Comment
Loosening ERISA's Preemptive Grip on HMO Medical
Malpractice Claims: A Response to PacifiCareof
Oklahoma v. Burrage
Seema R. Shah*
Barbara Jean Davidson arrived at St. John Medical Center
in Tulsa, Oklahoma with severe abdominal pain.1 Upon
admittance, a physician determined that Davidson had an acute
abdomen and heavy internal bleeding.2 Despite her condition,
the hospital released Davidson, who bled to death later that
night.' The personal representative of Davidson's estate, Clare
Davidson Schachter,4 brought suit against the physician who
directly provided Davidson's medical care, as well as PacifiCare
of Oklahoma, Davidson's employer-provided health maintenance
organization (HMO). In addition to fraud and loss of consortium,5 Schachter alleged that PacifiCare was vicariously

* J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Minnesota Law School; B-A. 1992,
Duke University.
1. Schachter v. PacifiCare of Okla., No. 94-C-203-BU, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14278, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 16, 1995).
2. Id. Dr. Rayburne W. Goen determined that Ms. Davidson's symptoms
resulted from a massive hematoma caused by internal bleeding and pernicious
anemia. Id. A hematoma is a localized mass of blood that is fairly confined
within a space. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 772 (Marjory Spraycar ed.,
26th ed. 1995) [hereinafter STEADNIAN'S]. Patients with anemia have low levels
of red blood cells (oxygen carrying components). Ms. Davidson's low level of red
blood cells was further complicated by an increased prothrombin time.
Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *2. Prothrombin is a blood clotting
agent. STEADMAN'S, supra, at 1446. Ms. Davidson thus had low levels of red
blood cells and compromised blood clotting mechanisms.
3. Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *3.
4. Ms. Schachter not only filed the original lawsuit as personal representative of the Davidson estate, but also on behalf of herself and Ms. Davidson's
other surviving children, Jack Davidson and Jill Davidson Rooney. Id. at *1.
5. Schachter alleged PacifiCare fraudulently induced Davidson to rely
upon PacifiCare for her health care. Schachter,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278,
at *3. Schachter brought a loss of consortium claim based on her mother's
alleged wrongful death. Id.
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liable under an ostensible agency theory6 for the medical
malpractice7 of its alleged agent physician.'
Arguing that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)9 preempted Schachter's state tort claims," PacifiCare
removed the case to federal court" and moved for summary
judgment. 2
The federal district court granted summary
judgment on the fraud claim," but remanded the remaining
pendent state law claims of medical malpractice and loss of
consortium to state court. 4 In an attempt to keep the claims
6. See infra note 81 and accompanying text (defining ostensible agency).
7. Malpractice usually is defined as a failure to exercise the required
degree of care, skill, and diligence under the circumstances. BARRY R. FURROW
ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 237 (1995); Michael Day, Attacking Defensive
Medicine Through Utilization PracticeParameters,16 J. LEGAL MED. 101, 114
(1994). A physician's duty of care entails a "duty to render a quality of care
consonant with the level of medical and practical knowledge the physician may
reasonably be expected to possess and the medical judgment he may be expected
to exercise." Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985). Medical
malpractice historically drives the "law of medical quality." Barry R. Furrow,
The Changing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From
SanctioningOutlaws to ManagingOutcomes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 147, 152 (1989).
Although in a state of reform, medical malpractice liability nevertheless has a
significant impact on quality in our health care system. The current widespread use of medical practice guidelines, for example, grew out of malpractice
liability concerns. Eleanor D. Kinney, MalpracticeReforms in the 1990s:Past
Disappointments, Future Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 99, 103
(1995).
8. Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *3.
9. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)); see infraPart I.B. (discussing ERISA's provisions).
10. Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *3.
11. Id. Judge Burrage heard the case in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Id. at *1. The federal district court
exercised removal jurisdiction over the fraud claim on the basis of the "complete
preemption" doctrine. Id. at *11; see infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text
(discussing complete preemption and removal jurisdiction in the context of
ERISA preemption).
12. Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *3.
13. The district court held ERISA preempted the fraud claim and therefore
PacifiCare was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at *10-*11. The court found
the fraud claim "related to" the employee benefit plan. Id. at *10. See generally
infra note 48 and accompanying text (noting ERISA explicitly preempts state
common law claims that "relate to" employee benefit plans).
14. Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *12. A district court "may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim... if... the district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3) (1994). The district court, in its discretion, declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the vicarious liability malpractice claim and the
loss of consortium claim. Schachter, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14278, at *12.
Accordingly, the court remanded those claims to state court for adjudication.
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out of state court, PacifiCare applied for a writ of mandamus,
maintaining that ERISA preempted the medical malpractice and
loss of consortium claims. 5 In PacifiCare of Oklahoma v.
Burrage,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit denied PacifiCare's request for a writ of mandamus and
held ERISA did not preempt the medical malpractice claim.'1
Medical malpractice claims against HIMOs based on
vicarious liability theories are the latest state common law
malpractice claims encountering ERISA's formidable preemption
structure. Courts already hold that ERISA preempts direct
liability claims against HMOs for corporate negligence in the
selection and retention of physicians and negligence involving
utilization review." By preserving vicarious liability claims,
PacifiCarerestrains ERISA preemption. Because PacifiCareis
a case of first impression among the federal circuit courts,"
future courts undoubtedly will rely on it for guidance on how to
loosen state common law medical malpractice claims from
ERISA's preemptive grip.
This Comment contends that courts should not follow
PacifiCare'sapproach in future HMO medical malpractice cases.

Id.
15. Typically, a remand order does not represent a final judgment
reviewable by appeal. A writ of mandamus to compel action, however, can be
used to seek review of a remand order. PacifiCare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d
151, 153 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S.
336, 352-53 (1976)). PacifiCare sought a writ of mandamus because a writ was
the only method for the circuit court to review the ERISA preemption issues
raised in the case. Id. at 152. PacifiCare sought a revocation of the remand
order and a holding that ERISA preempted Schachter's two remaining claims.
Id.
16. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
17. Id. at 155. The court also held ERISA did not preempt the loss of
consortium claim to the extent the claim was based on PacifiCare's vicarious
liability. Id.
18. Corporate negligence in the selection or supervision of medical staff
members and in the denial of "medically necessary and appropriate care" results
in direct liability. CHARLES G. BENDA & FAY A. RozovsKY, MANAGED CARE AND
THE LAW: LIABiLrrY AND RISK MANAGEmENT § 6.5:1 (1996); William A.
Chittenden IH, MalpracticeLiability and Managed Health Care:History and
Prognosis,26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 453 (1991) (noting that utilization review
liability is a form of direct liability); see also Torin A. Porros & T. Howard
Stone, Implications ofNegligentSelection and Retention of Physiciansin the Age
ofERISA, 21AMi. J.L. & MED. 383,410-14 (1995) (discussing ERISA preemption
of claims involving corporate liability); infra note 79 and accompanying text
(discussing ERISA preemption cases involving utilization review liability).
19. PacifiCare,59 F.3d at 153.
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Part I briefly reviews ERISA and its preemption jurisprudence
with respect to HMO malpractice claims based on vicarious
liability. Part II discusses the Tenth Circuit's holding and
analysis in PacifiCare. Part III critiques the court's reasoning
in PacifiCare and concludes that notwithstanding its proper
result, the court's approach has shortcomings that could
jeopardize future ERISA preemption cases.
PacifiCare's
approach rests on a deficient characterization of the vicarious
liability medical malpractice claim, increases inconsistency
within the field of ERISA preemption, and ignores the purpose
of ERISA. This Comment proposes that courts adopt an
approach to ERISA preemption of HMO vicarious liability claims
that better reflects ERISA's purpose, current preemption
jurisprudence, and public policy concerns regarding equity and
quality in the health care system.
I. THE HMO'S ROLE IN HEALTH CARE AND THE ERISA
PREEMPTION SCHEME
A. THE CONTiUING RISE OF THE HMO
The national health care cost crisis has prompted significant
changes in the health care industry.20 While the public and
private sectors continue to debate the best remedy for the
nation's health care ills, 21 many reform plans prominently
feature measures designed to control health care costs. 2 2 Given
the increasing call for cost-containment mechanisms, the concept
of managed care 23 has experienced rapid growth.24

20. BENDA & RozovsKY, supra note 18, §§ 1.1-1.2.
21. E.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Will Reform Bankrupt Us?, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
15, 1994, at 50.
22. See G.A. Pane & E.H. Taliaferro, Health Care Cost Containment:An
Overview of Policy Options, 23 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 103 (1987) ("While
health care has become one of the leading policy concerns of the American
public, cost containment has emerged as the most prominent underlying
factor."); Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical MalpracticeLaw andHealth Care
Cost Containment:Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE
L.J. 1297, 1297 (1994) (describing how medical expenditures are consuming an
increasing proportion of the nation's resources).
23. Defined broadly, managed care organizations combine health care
financing and delivery functions within a single entity focusing on utilization
control. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 308-09; Michael Day, Attacking
Defensive Medicine Through UtilizationPracticeParameters,16 J. LEGAL MED.
101, 114 (1994).
24. Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., Change and Growth in Managed Care,HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Winter 1991, at 19.
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Of the various types of managed care organizations, HMOs
are the most common.25 HMOs function as both health care
insurers and providers in the health care industry.2 6 As
insurers, 1iMOs typically employ utilization review, a cost
control strategy which evaluates the necessity and appropriateness of the medical care provided to individual patients.2 The
rapid growth of HMOs and the consequent expanded use of costcontainment techniques have increased the influence that HMOs
have on medical decision making 28 and health care delivery.29
25. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 309. HMOs exist in various forms,
distinguishable by their relationship between the HMO and physicians. See
BENDA & ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 1.1 (discussing different types of HMOs).
The staff model HMO directly employs salaried physicians; the Independent
Practice Association (IPA) model contracts with an association, which in turn
contracts with independent physicians; and the group model HMO contracts
with physician groups or partnerships. Chittenden, supra note 18, at 452-53.
Approximately 48% of HMOs are IPAs and 38% are staff or group model HMOs.
FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 309. An IMO's form may determine its
potential malpractice liability. For example, staff model HMOs are susceptible
to respondeat superior liability, while the IPA and Group models are vulnerable
to vicarious liability via ostensible agency. Chittenden, supra note 18, at 455,
464.
Other types of managed care organizations include preferred provider
organizations (PPOs) and physician-hospital organizations (PHOs). Unlike
HMOs, which act as both insurer and health care deliverer, PPOs are
organizations made up of health care providers that contract with independent
insurers and employers to deliver care for patients covered by a particular
health plan. BENDA & RozovsKY, supra note 18, § 2.4.2. Like PPOs, PHOs
obtain health care delivery contracts from insurers or employers. PHOs,
however, are jointly set up and owned by a hospital and a group of physicians.
Id. § 2.4.4.
26. BENDA & RozovsKY, supra note 18, § 1.2; FURROW ET AL., supra note
7, at 309. In the high-cost fee-for-service system, insurers and providers are
separate entities. BENDA & ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 1.2. HMOs are further
distinguished from high-cost fee-for-service medicine in that they prospectively
charge a fixed per capita fee. Id.
27. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 321-22 (noting that HIMOs design
utilization review or management into their structure); Frankel, supra note 22,
at 1302 (defining utilization review and discussing management techniques).
Utilization review often mandates precertification or concurrent review, which
differs from the traditional health insurance practice of determining whether
the health plan will pay for the care after treatment is provided. BENDA &
ROZOVSKY, supra note 18, § 3.3.2.
28. See Frankel, supra note 22, at 1320 (describing the process by which
HMOs make medical decisions that traditionally are reserved solely for
physicians). This diffusion of medical authority from individual physicians to
cost-containment actors, such as HMOs, leaves physicians in an uncomfortable
position. See id. (discussing HMOs' review of physicians' treatment plans and
imposition of alternative courses of treatment). HMOs take away costly
resources physicians need to maintain the current standard of care, but the
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Now, instead of merely reviewing and paying for participants'
health care, many HMOs enter into contracts with health care
provider groups or directly hire their own health care professionals to provide medical services."°
B.

THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF

1974
1. Enactment and Purpose
In the early 1970s, improper management of welfare and
retirement plan funds and the lack of certain minimum standards compromised the stability of the growing number of
employee benefit plans."' In response, Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19742 for the
"continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents" who relied on the plans. 33
Dubbed the

current system of liability nonetheless holds physicians directly and primarily
liable for not meeting that standard of care. Id. at 1322; see also Arnold S.
Relman, The Futureof MedicalPractice,22 PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE 23, 24 (1996)
(lamenting the end of physician autonomy in the face of managed care's
intrusion into clinical decision making and control of medical care spending).
29. The number of employees covered by group health plans enrolled in
HMOs and Preferred Provider Organizations increased from 4% in 1981 to 27%
in 1987. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 309. In 1988, HMOs served more
than 31 million subscribers. Chittenden, supra note 18, at 451 n.1. Between
1980 and 1992, the number of liMOs more than doubled while HMO enrollment
quadrupled to 41.4 million (16% of the U.S. population). BENDA & RozovsKY,
supra note 18, § 2.4. By the end of 1994, an estimated 50.5 million participants
enrolled in HiMOs for their health care needs. Id. § 2.4.
30. See supra note 25 (discussing HMO-physician relationships).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (ERISA's findings and purposes statement).
Between 1940 and 1950, the number of employees covered by private pension
plans in the United States increased from 4 million to 10 million. H.R. REP.
No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4641. By 1960, private pension plans covered over 21 million employees. Id.
An enormous expansion of assets reserved for the payment of benefits under
these plans accompanied the rapid growth of pension coverage. Id. In 1958,
Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in an effort to
regulate pension and welfare funds. Id. at 4, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4642.
Congress eventually passed enforcement-targeted amendments to the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in response to the continued threat to the
growing number of employee benefit plans, but these additions were ineffective.
Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994)).
33. Id. § 2, 88 Stat. at 832.
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"pension 'bill of rights,"'' 4 ERISA reflects Congress's primary
purpose of protecting individual pension rights." Although the
primary objective was the protection of employees, 36 Congress
also recognized the need to minimize the burdens on those
employers who voluntarily set up employee benefit plans. 7
2. ERISA's Coverage
To protect employee participants and beneficiaries, ERISA
imposes federal regulatory control over the establishment,
operation, and administration of employee benefit plans,3"
including employee health care plans often administered by
HMOs or other managed care organizations. 9 ERISA provides
safeguards that require reporting and disclosure, and establishes
standards for minimum vesting, fiscal responsibility, and

34. 120 CONG. REC. 29,935 (1973) (statement of Senator Javits, one of
ERISA's sponsors). Another congressional supporter called ERISA the workers'
"version of an emancipation proclamation." 120 CONG. REC. 29,193 (1974)
(statement of Senator Biaggi).
35. H.R. REP. No. 533, at 1, 1974 U.S.C.CAN. at 4640.
36. Indeed, ERISA's opening "[clongressional findings and declaration of
policy" repeatedly refers to "the interests of employees." 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
ERISA's legislative history further documents the motivation behind its
enactment. In the hearings over earlier employee benefit plan reform bill, the
Senate Labor Committee heard the tragic stories of employees deprived of
expected pension benefits after years of loyalty and hard work. 120 CONG. REC.
29,934-35 (statement of Senator Javits). William Wheeler of Ohio testified that
after 42 years of service to a Cleveland plant, he was given $46.02 a month in
pension benefits after the plant was downsized. Id. at 29,934. Similarly,
Robert Pratt of New York received no pension benefits despite 47 years of
service because the failing company laid off workers and terminated the
employee benefit plans. Id. at 29,934-35; see also 1974 CONGRESSIONAL
INFORMATION SERVICE/ANNUAL 157-58 (summarizing the hearings); 1973
CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION SERVICE/ANNUAL 144-45 (same).
37. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 31, at 1, 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. at 4640.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (requiring that "safeguards be provided with respect
to the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit]
plans").
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994) (defining an employee benefit plan as any
find "established or maintained by an employer... for the purpose of providing
for its participants or their beneficiaries... medical, surgical, or hospital care
or benefits"). Some HMOs are within ERISA's purview because ERISA covers
health plans offering participants membership in an HMO. 46 Fed. Reg. 5883
(1981).
By 1994, the percentage of employees covered under managed health care
plans had grown to approximately 63% of all employees. BENDA & ROzOvsKY,
supra note 18, § 1.1. Experts predict that by 1996, nine out of ten employers
will have managed care components in their health benefit plans. Id.
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fiduciary duties.4 °
3. Enforcement Provisions
In addition to its regulatory sections, ERISA contains
several enforcement provisions. ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme, § 502(a),4 ' provides employee participants with access
to judicial remedies.42 Under § 502(a)(1)(B), an employee
benefit plan participant or beneficiary can bring a civil action in
federal or state court to "recover benefits due," enforce rights, or
clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.43
ERISA also includes a broad preemption provision, § 514(a), 4
among its enforcement provisions. Congress enacted ERISA's
preemption clause to achieve protective regulatory uniformity
without the encumbrances of potentially conflicting state
laws.4 5 The preemption clause explicitly states that ERISA's

40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994) (detailing the reporting and

disclosure requirements); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1994) (providing the
minimum funding

standards); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994) (assigning
fiduciary responsibility).
41. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994)).
42. ERISA's civil enforcement scheme limits the available remedies to
accrued benefits, declaratory judgments, and injunctions. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
In reality however, these remedies are not readily available, especially the
recovery of benefits. See Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U.
PriT. L. REv. 1, 3 (1992) (arguing courts have created legal obstacles to the
recovery ofbenefits which often result in the denial of benefits, despite ERISA's
purpose). Plaintiffs who bring a federal cause of action under ERISA's civil
enforcement provision cannot recover punitive and extra-contractual (monetary
compensatory) damage awards. Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under
ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REv. 631, 637-40 (1994).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). ERISA's civil enforcement provisions also
allow the Secretary of Labor and a plan's fiduciary to bring civil actions. See
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), (a)(3) (1994) (including fiduciaries among persons
empowered to bring suit).
44. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
45. In enacting ERISA, Congress aimed to "clear the field" for exclusive
federal control. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983). Senator
Javits, one of the sponsors of the original Senate bill, explained the Conference
Committee's adoption of the present preemption clause:
Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law,
but-with one major exception appearing in the House bill-defined
the perimeters of preemption in relation to the areas regulated by the
bill. Such a formulation raised the possibility of endless litigation over
the validity of State action that might impinge on federal regulation,
as well as opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State
laws .... [Tihe emergence of a comprehensive and pervasive Federal
interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to interstate plans
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provisions, with a few exceptions,4" "shall supersede any and all
State laws47 insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan."4" Preemption of state common law is

required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement of State action
in the field of private employee benefit programs.
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Senator Javits).
The rationale behind uniformity was to avoid the administrative burdens
that compliance with different federal and state laws would impose upon
employers. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987). Members
of Congress were concerned employers would shift the cost of the administrative
burdens to employees and their beneficiaries by lowering benefit levels. Id. To
avoid this problem, "Congress intended pre-emption to afford employers [and
employee benefit plans] the advantages of a uniform set of administrative
procedures governed by a single set of regulations." Id. at 11.
46. The most notable exception to ERISA's seemingly absolute preemption
provision is the "savings clause," which states that "nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)
(1994). ERISA's "deemer clause," however, restrains this exception. This clause
prohibits states from deeming an employee benefit plan to be an insurance
company or other insurer, bank, trust, or investment company in order to use
the savings clause. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
47. The phrase "State laws" includes any judicially decided common law
and legislatively enacted state statutes having "the effect of law." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(c)(1) (1994).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added). A state law "relates to" an
employee benefit plan if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 n.16. Drawing upon Shaw's interpretation of the phrase,
lower federal courts recognize four categories of laws that "relate to" employee
benefit plans:
First, laws that regulate the type of benefits or terms of ERISA plans.
Second, laws that create reporting, disclosure, funding, or vesting
requirements for ERISA plans. Third, laws that provide rules for the
calculation of the amount of benefits to be paid under ERISA plans.
Fourth, laws and common-law rules that provide remedies for
misconduct growing out of the administration of the ERISA plan.
National Elevator Indus. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558-59 (10th Cir.) (quoting
Martori Bros. Distribs. v. James-Massengale, 781 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992).
Congress, at the last moment, changed the language of the preemption
provision to its present form. The language in the original House version of the
bill limited preemption to those areas specifically regulated by ERISA. Shaw,
463 U.S. at 98. The Act's conference committee rejected that language in favor
of the current version of the preemption provision. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942
(1974) (statement of Senator Javits). Senator Javits' comments confirm that the
Conference Committee did not accept the change in language lightly. Congress
was aware that the preemption policy might have "the effect of precluding
essential legislation at either the State or Federal level." Id. Hence, Congress
intended that federal courts would step in when preemption was questionable
and develop federal common law to resolve the ambiguity. Id.; Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987). Absent legislative amendments, the
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significant because state law claims generally permit damage
awards, while ERISA causes of action do not.4 9 Sections
502(a)(1)(B) and 514(a) are integral to ERISA's preemption
structure and thus greatly influence federal courts' role in
ERISA preemption cases.
4. The Role of Federal Courts
Before deciding whether ERISA preempts a state common
law claim, federal courts must resolve the threshold removal
jurisdiction issue.5" If a federal court determines that removal
is proper, it can readily dispose of the preemption issue.5' If,
however, the court determines that removal is improper,52 it
must remand the case to state court for resolution of the
preemption issue.

only check on ERISA preemption currently available is the federal court system
and the development of federal common law.
The creation of federal law turns on the question of "whether common law
is needed to fulfill Congress's purposes in adopting a particular statute....
Congress cannot foresee every possibility. Inevitably, statutes have gaps and
the application of statutes to specific situations requires the development of
rules not created within the laws." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3 (2d ed. 1994).
49. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's
remedies).
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, § 5.1 (observing that jurisdiction is
the legal authority to hear, deliberate, and decide the merits of a case). To
determine whether removal is appropriate, the court must assess whether the
state law claim can fall within ERISA's civil enforcement provision as a federal
cause of action.
51. If a federal cause of action under ERISA exists, the plaintiffs state
common law actions are preempted. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52-54 (finding
claims falling under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions are meant to be
exclusive and state claims are thus preempted).
52. Removal is improper if the state common law claim does not satisfy the
principles of complete preemption, namely that the state common law claim is
not a claim for benefits, a claim to enforce rights, or a claim to clarify rights.
See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing the complete
preemption doctrine).
53. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 564 (1995). The preemption issue is resolved by deciding whether the
state law claim sufficiently "relates to" the employee benefit plan covered by
ERISA. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the ERISA
preemption test).
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C. ERISA's PREEMPTION STRUCTURE
1. Complete Preemption and Federal Preemption Within
ERISA
ERISA's primary civil enforcement provision,
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 54 directly implicates the complete preemption
doctrine, thereby establishing federal question jurisdiction.5 5
Because federal question jurisdiction exists, a defendant can
56
remove an ERISA claim from state court to federal court.
Specifically, suits brought by employee benefit plan participants
or beneficiaries under § 502(a)(1)(B) to recover benefits due,
enforce employee benefit plan rights, or clarify plan rights are
removable to federal court.5" Moreover, if federal courts can
properly recharacterize a state common law claim as a federal
cause of action arising under § 502(a)(1)(B), they can exercise
removal jurisdiction."

54. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
55. Under the "well-pleaded complaint rule" original federal jurisdiction
only exists when a federal question is presented on the face of a plaintiff's
properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987). The complete preemption doctrine is an independent corollary to the
well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 393. Under the complete preemption
doctrine, a federal statute endowed with such extraordinary preemptive power
"converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal
claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987). The complete preemption doctrine
provides that if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of
action, any claim that comes within the federal cause of action is necessarily
federal in character. See id. at 66; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also Goepel v. National Postal Mail
Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 308-12 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing the Supreme
Court's complete preemption doctrine), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1691 (1995).
56. Removal jurisdiction is based on original federal jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) ("[Any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States.").
ERISA's primary enforcement provision creates a federal cause of action under
the complete preemption doctrine. See Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639 (7th
Cir. 1995) (identifying § 502(a) as the basis of complete preemption in ERISA);
Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Dukes, 57
F.3d at 355 (same).
57. MetropolitanLife, 481 U.S. at 66 (finding the legislative history clearly
indicates Congress intended to make causes of action in § 502(a) removable to
federal court); see supra note 43 and accompanying text (identifying the three
types of ERISA claims that plaintiffs may bring).
58. See Rice, 65 F.3d at 642 (determining whether a vicarious liability
medical malpractice claim can be properly recharacterized as a suit within the
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Whereas ERISA's civil enforcement provision implicates the
complete preemption doctrine, ERISA's preemption clause
triggers traditional federal preemption. 9 Under traditional
preemption doctrine, ERISA overrides and displaces state law6 °
by virtue of its express preemption provision."' Although
complete preemption and federal preemption inquiries are
separate, their results are linked. If a claim is completely
preempted under ERISA, it is necessarily preempted because
claims subject to complete preemption constitute a subset of the
claims subject to preemption. 2 Hence, even if a federal court
determines that a state common law claim escapes complete
preemption removal to federal court, the claim may still fall prey
to ERISA preemption.6"
The preemption doctrine does not advocate the wholesale
displacement of state law. Instead, in traditional preemption

scope of § 502(a)).
59. Complete preemption and federal preemption are two distinct concepts.
Federal preemption is typically a defense to a state common law claim. As
such, it does not appear on the face of the plaintiffs complaint. Metropolitan
Life, 481 U.S. at 63. Hence, unlike complete preemption in § 502(a), preemption
under § 514(a) does not by itself confer removal jurisdiction over an arguably
preempted state common law claim. Id. at 64; see also Caterpillar,482 U.S. at
393 ([I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on
the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption."). For
clarity, this Comment uses the phrases complete preemption and ERISA
preemption to distinguish between complete preemption under ERISA § 502(a)
and federal preemption under § 514.
60. Congress derives its power to preempt state law from the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,

208 (1985).
61. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (finding ERISA's
provisions "speak expressly to the question of preemption" (emphasis added)).
Preemption 'is compelled whether Congress' [sic] command is explicitly stated
in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
62. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 564 (1995). Claims subject to complete preemption are those that
seek to recover benefits, enforce rights, or clarify the benefits under the
employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). These three federal claims
all directly 'relate to" the employee benefit plan and are thus preempted by the
ERISA preemption clause. Plaintiffs with completely preempted state law
claims can still bring their claims as an ERISA cause of action, but their
remedies will be severely limited. See supra note 42 and accompanying text
(discussing ERISA's judicial remedies).
63. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355. Because ERISA preemption applies to a larger
group of state common law claims than complete preemption, more claims than
just the three designated for complete preemption can "relate to" an employee
benefit plan.
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cases, courts begin with a presumption against preemption"
and, therefore, construe express preemption provisions narrowly.6" In ERISA cases, however, courts have rarely invoked
this canon to limit the reach of ERISA's preemption clause.66

64. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)
(examining the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act's preemption
provision through a "presumption against preemption" lens); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 741 (1985) ("The presumption is
against pre-emption, and we are not inclined to read limitations into federal
statutes in order to enlarge their pre-emptive scope."); Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (noting a presumption that "Congress did not intend
to displace state law").
The canon has its roots in federalism, which counsels against federal
abrogation of the states' police powers, particularly in matters of health and
safety. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)
(affirming that "the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and
historically, a matter of local concern"). The presumption against preemption
of state law applies equally to legislatively enacted (state statute) or judicially
mandated law (common law). Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 403 (1963).
65. Cipollone, 505 U.S. 518. Supporting Cipollone's articulation of the
"presumption against displacement of state law" canon, Justice Blackmun, in
partial concurrence, stated, "[t]he principles of federalism and respect for state
sovereignty that underlie the Court's reluctance to find pre-emption where
Congress has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force where
Congress has spoken, though ambiguously." Id. at 533. Courts embarking on
such an analysis must determine "not whether Congress intended to pre-empt
state regulation, but to what extent." Id. (Blackmun, J., Kennedy J., Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Courts attempting to infer the scope
of preemption will most likely rely heavily on explicit statements or indications
of a statute's purpose. For example Cipollone, considered the 1965 Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act's statement of purpose first in its
analysis. The Court then narrowly interpreted the Act's preemption provision
and confirmed the Act does not preempt state law damages claims. Id. at 51819.
66. Prominent Supreme Court ERISA preemption cases from 1983 to 1992
do not even mention the presumption against preemption. See generally
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992)
(addressing ERISA preemption of state statute obligating employer-covered
health insurance for injured employees); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498
U.S. 133 (1990) (involving ERISA preemption of wrongful discharge action);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (examining ERISA preemption
of criminal statute requiring unused vacation benefit payments); Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (addressing ERISA
preemption of state garnishment statute); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1 (1987) (addressing ERISA preemption of statute mandating
severance pay to employees); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)
(determining whether ERISA preempts a state common law suit asserting the
improper process of claim for benefits); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85
(1983) (involving ERISA preemption of law forbidding discrimination in
employment, including employee benefit plans). But see Metropolitan Life Ins.
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2. ERISA Preemption's Scope and Application
The parameters of ERISA preemption are broad,"7 but not
unlimited. ERISA does not preempt state common law claims
that "affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates
to' the plan."6 8 ERISA also does not preempt "run-of-the-mill"
state common law claims.6 9 In addition, ERISA preemption
jurisprudence has continued to evolve. ° The Supreme Court,
vexed by the inadequacy of ERISA's text,7 ' determined that
courts should "go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating
difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740-41 (1985) (readily invoking the presumption against preemption canon when confronted with an area traditionally
regulated by the states).
67. A state law "relates to" an employee benefit plan if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97 & n.16. Shaw
asserted the encompassing language ofERISA's preemption provision demanded
an equally broad preemptive reach. Id. at 96 (noting "It]he breadth of§ 514(a)'s
pre-emptive reach is apparent from that section's language."); see also
MetropolitanLife, 471 U.S. at 739-40, 745-46 & n.23 (1985) (citing Shaw and
describing § 514 as a "sweeping general pre-emption clause"). Shaw's
establishment of the broad nature of ERISA preemption is an enduring fixture
in ERISA preemption jurisprudence; numerous Supreme Court and lower
federal court opinions have cited to it.
68. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21. Recognizing this limitation, courts found
that state laws of general application with a limited or "indirect" economic effect
on ERISA plans do not "relate to" ERISA plans. National Elevator Indus. v.
Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555, 1558 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1987);
Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enters.,
793 F.2d 1456, 1470 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987)).
69. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 833.
70. See generally Karen A. Jordan, Travelers Insurance:New Support for
the Argument to RestrainERISA Pre-emption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255 (1996)
(examining past ERISA preemption cases and discussing a recent Supreme
Court case that signals a change in ERISA preemption analysis).
71. The recurring complexity of the preemption issue has frustrated the
Supreme Court. Since ERISA's enactment, the ERISA preemption pendulum
has swung from attributing expansive breadth to ERISA's preemptive reach to
a narrower interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause and greater judicial
deference toward state regulation. Compare Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85 and Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (broadly interpreting ERISA's
preemption provision and favoring significantly less deference to states in their
preemption analysis) with Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989),
Mackey, 486 U.S 825, and Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)
(providing greater deference to state regulation and narrowly interpreting
ERISA's preemption clause).
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state law that Congress understood would survive. " "
Amid enormous growth in ERISA preemption litigation,"3
the scope of ERISA's preemption provision also has prompted
debate among legal commentators.7 4 ERISA supporters applaud the uniformity and reduced administrative burdens that
ERISA's preemption provision secured.7 5
Some critics,
however, cite ERISA preemption's negative impact on injured
plaintiffs and state-initiated health care reform. 6 Others
72. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995). The Court's conclusion appears to
echo Justice Stevens' dissent in an earlier ERISA preemption case. See District
of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 133-38 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In the face of "burgeoning" ERISA preemption
litigation, Justice Stevens favored a retreat from the Court's fixation on the text
of ERISA's preemption clause:
Several years ago a District Judge who had read "nearly 100 cases
about the reach of the ERISA preemption clause" concluded that
"common sense should not be left at the courthouse door." A recent
LEXIS search indicates that there are now over 2,800 judicial opinions
addressing ERISA preemption. This growth may be a consequence of
the growing emphasis on the meaning of the words "relate to," thus
pre-empting reliance on what the District Judge referred to as
"common sense."
Id. at 135 n.3 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens further argued that:
Instead of mechanically repeating earlier dictionary definitions of the
word "relate" as its only guide to decision in an important and difficult
area of statutory construction, the Court should pause to consider, first,
the wisdom of the basic rule disfavoring federal pre-emption of state
laws, and second, the specific concerns identified in the legislative
history as the basis for federal pre-emption.
Id. at 138.
73. According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the number
of cases filed in federal district courts has risen from 6,884 in 1988 to 10,536 in
1993. Randall Samborn, ERISA Is Prototype for Pre-Emption,NAT'L L.J., Apr.
17, 1995, at Al, A26.
74. See id. at Al, A26 (surveying the positions of supporters and critics of
ERISA preemption).
75. Id. at A26.
76. See generally Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care
Reform, 28 COLUAI. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 609 (1995) (criticizing the disastrous
effects of ERISA preemption on state health care reform plans); James E.
Holloway, ERISA, Preemption,and Comprehensive FederalHealth Care:A Call
for "CooperativeFederalism"to Preservethe States'Role in FormulatingHealth
Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 405 (1994) (maintaining ERISA has a negative
impact on state health care law but that amending ERISA may not be the
answer); Samborn, supra note 73, at A26 (noting the effects of preemption on
ERISA plaintiffs). Injured ERISA-covered plaintiffs are caught in a tragic
situation. They are unable to bring an ERISA cause of action for monetary
awards, yet they also are deprived of monetary remedies normally available
under state common law because ERISA bars all state common law suits that
"relate to" employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). As one ERISA
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criticize the federal courts for their "abdication of judicial lawmaking authority" in the face of ERISA's primary purpose."
D. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO ERISA PREEMPTION OF
HMO MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
While HMOs have successfully raised ERISA preemption as
a defense in medical malpractice 8 cases based on direct negligence, 9 district courts disagree on whether ERISA preempts

expert remarked, "the broad pre-emption and the lack of remedies... [make]
plan participants worse off now than they were 20 years ago, before ERISA was
passed." Samborn, supra note 73, at A26. As a result, plaintiffs' attorneys note
the cost of filing an ERISA suit is often far greater than the potential recovery.
Id. The Department of Labor has also joined the struggle for participant
benefits as amicus curiae in several suits. Id. See generally Michael Daly,
Attacking Defensive Medicine Through the Utilization of PracticeParameters,
16 J. LEGAL MED. 101, 120-23 (1995) (arguing that either Congress should
amend ERISA to allow state law actions directly against HMOs or courts should
carve out a preemption exception for HMOs); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein,
Employee Benefits for General Practitioners:Ten Rules that Every Attorney
Should Know About ERISA, 26 TEx. TECH L. REv. 579, 580 (1995) (referring to
ERISA as "Every Ridiculous Idea Since Adam").
77. Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care
Industry: An Abdication of Judicial Law-CreatingAuthority, 46 FLA. L. REV.
355,356 (1994) (criticizing the Supreme Court's broad interpretation ofERISA's
preemption clause and refusal to create federal common law to replace
preempted state law).
78. Large-scale health care providers, such as hospitals, are subject to
malpractice liability under a number of theories. See FURROW ET AL., supra
note 7, §§ 7-2 to 7-4. Increasingly, courts appear more willing to extend these
negligence theories to HMOs. See generally Chittenden, supra note 18, at 45385 (comparing various theories of liability and their application to hospitals and
HMOs). HMOs, however, have several defenses available to them to minimize
their potential liability exposure. See id. at 465-68, 485-92 (discussing the
preventive measures and statutory defenses that HMOs can bring).
79. Courts appear more willing to preempt direct negligence claims because
such claims involve the administration of plan benefits or assert a denial of
benefits, both clearly within ERISA's mandate. Two of the most well-known
and harshly criticized direct negligence cases were brought against HMOs on
the basis of their utilization review role. Corcoran v. United HealthCarewas
originally filed as a wrongful death action in a Louisiana state court. 965 F.2d
1321, 1324 (5th Cir.) (involving the death of an unborn child during the last
stage of a high-risk pregnancy in which the HMO denied pre-certification for a
hospital stay against the physician's recommendation), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1033 (1992). The defendant HMO removed the malpractice claim to federal
court and raised preemption. Id. at 1324-25; see supra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text (discussing the removal of claims arguably preempted by
ERISA). On review, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held ERISA preempted
the state tort action. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1339. Though troubled that its
holding denied the Corcorans any form of state or federal remedy, the court
nevertheless maintained that ERISA compelled such a result and the task of
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indirect negligence claims, such as ostensible agency malpractice
claims." An ostensible agency malpractice claim asserts that
a physician was negligent, and that an ostensible agency
relationship exists between the negligent physician and the
HMO.8 Such a relationship generally exists if the HMO "holds
out" the physician as its agent and the patient looks to the
HMO,82 rather than to the individual physician, for medical
care.

Several district courts hold ERISA does not preempt
ostensible agency malpractice claims because such claims do not
"relate to" the employee benefit plan. 3 Those courts found that
reevaluating ERISA lies with Congress. Id. at 1328-39. Corcoranheld ERISA's
remedial scheme did not include the extracontractual damages sought by the
Corcorans despite agreement that the Corcorans did not have any available
remedy under ERISA. Id. at 1334-39.
Analogously, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held ERISA preempted
a wrongful death action against an HMO allegedly responsible for making a
utilization review decision regarding a heart transplant that led to a patient's
death. Kuhl v. Lincoln Natl Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994). Like Corcoran,Kuhl agreed with the district
court that ERISA did not permit the Kuhls to recover monetary damages. Id.
Significantly, the plaintiffs in Corcoran and Kuhl unsuccessfully sought to
challenge administrative decisions made by HMOs whose role was limited to
utilization review and were not health care providers. In contrast, the HMO in
Kohn v. Delaware Valley HMO, No. CIV.A.91-2745, 1992 WL 22241, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 5, 1992), faced state tort claims both for its failure to precertify
treatment (utilization review) and for vicariously providing negligent medical
services through its physician-agents. Kohn held ERISA preempted the
negligence claim for failure to precertify treatment, but did not preempt the
ostensible agency claim. Id. at *4 (reasoning ostensible agency claims are not
based on benefit plan obligations, while utilization review decisions are
basically determinations for benefits).
80. John A. Breviu, Health Care and ERISA, HENNEPIN LAW. (Minnesota),
Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 27, 29.
81. Ostensible agency liability is based on vicarious liability-agency
principles. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 292; see also infra note 99
(discussing vicarious liability principles).
82. Chittenden, supra note 18, at 458; see also Weldon v. Seminole Mun.
Hosp., 709 P.2d 1058, 1059-61 (Okla. 1985) (discussing Oklahoma courts'
articulation of the ostensible agency relationship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 429 (1965) (stating that "[olne who employs an independent contractor
to perform services for another which are accepted in the reasonable belief that
the services are being rendered by the employer or by his servants, is subject
to liability for physical harm caused by the negligence of the contractor in
supplying such services, to the same extent as though the employer were
supplying them himself or by his servants").
83. See Jackson v. Roseman, 878 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Md. 1995)
(disagreeing with courts that hold medical malpractice claims based on direct
or vicarious liability theories relate to the benefit plan); Haas v. Group Health

1562

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1545

minor reference to the plan to establish the ostensible agency
relationship does not justify preemption.' More importantly,
the courts rejected the argument that the ostensible agency
malpractice suits involve claims for denied benefits and are
therefore preempted under ERISA's primary civil enforcement
provision.8 5 Instead, the courts determined that, under these
claims, the patient received medical benefits that were negligently provided.8" Other courts also hesitated to eliminate
state tort claims without the express authorization of Congress. 87
District courts holding ERISA preempts HMO vicarious
liability malpractice claims generally have maintained that
agency claims are based on "circumstances of medical treatment."8 Because these ostensible agency claims were made

Plan, 875 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ill.
1994) (holding that a vicarious liability
malpractice claim does not "refer to and apply solely to an ERISA plan, but
rather.., is tort law of general application with an incidental effect on ERISA
plans"); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 185-86 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (noting "the term 'related to' is not to be taken literally but rather must
be applied consistent with the policies underlying ERISA"); Independence HMO
v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 988-89 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting the HMO
argument that the malpractice claim against the HMO was a state tort claim
that relates to the ERISA plan).
84. Jackson, 878 F. Supp. at 826 (finding that reference to the plan only to
prove agency does not implicate the policy concerns of ERISA); Haas, 875 F.
Supp. at 549 (holding the mere fact that a claim requires examination of the
plan to resolve a contractual issue of whether the HMO held out a physician as
its agent does not justify preemption); Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 186 (arguing
ERISA concerns are not implicated by a reference to the plan as evidence that
the HMO held someone out as its agent).
85. See, e.g., Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 186.
86. E.g., Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 186.
87. See Haas,875 F. Supp. at 549 ("This Court is reluctant to preempt state
tort law claims based on substandard treatment, a claim unrelated to
administration of a plan, where there is no reliable evidence of Congressional
intent to do so."); Elsesser v. Hospital of Phila. College of Osteopathic Medicine,
802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (refusing to find that ERISA preempts
traditionally state law professional malpractice actions in the absence of
congressional intent).
88. See, e.g., Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, 753 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D. Conn.
1990) ("ERISA... preempts the [state law claims]... since they all 'have one
central feature: the circumstances of [the plaintiffs] medical treatment under
his employer's [medical] services plan for employees.'"); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840
F. Supp. 316, 317 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing and following Altieri); Nealy v. U.S.
Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (analogizing its facts
to those inAltieri); Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Medical Serv., 868 F. Supp. 110,
114 (D. Md. 1994) (reaching the same conclusion but citing Rollo v. Maxicare
of La., 695 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D. La. 1988)).
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pursuant to the employee health care plan, the courts deemed
them "related to" to the plan.89 Furthermore, the malpractice
claims involved the quality of benefits promised by the plan. 90
According to these courts, ERISA preempts these claims
attacking the denial of promised quality benefits because they
involve referencing the plan to determine what was promised.9 '
In contrast, in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., the Third
Circuit held that claims attacking quality are not claims to
recover denied medical benefits and, therefore, are not completely preempted. 92 The court found that the legislative
history, structure, purpose, and civil enforcement provision of
ERISA say nothing about controlling the quality of benefits
received by plan participants." Accordingly, the court reversed
the lower court ruling and adopted the characterization of the
ostensible agency malpractice claim as one involving the quality
of the benefits.9 4

89. See, e.g., Pomeroy, 868 F. Supp. at 113 (maintaining ostensible agency
malpractice claims necessarily involve an examination of the HMO's representations regarding its physician and that such an inquiry focuses on explanations
of the benefit plan); Visconti v. U.S. Health Care, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1104-05
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that determination of an ostensible agency relationship
would require examination of the plan and thus "relates to" it), rev'd and
remandedsub nom., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995); Nealy, 844 F. Supp. at 973 (noting the relationship between the IMO, doctor, and patient is based on the terms of the plan);
Ricci, 840 F. Supp. at 317 (noting the contract defines the relationship between
provider and physician and affects the circumstances of medical treatment).
90. An employee health benefits plan promises HMO enrollees "medical
services of a given extent and quality. A malpractice claim asserts the services
provided did not measure up to the benefit plan's promised quality." Dukes v.
U.S. Health Care Sys., 848 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd and remanded
sub nom., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 564 (1995).
91. "The question is one of relating plan-performance to plan-promise, and
is therefore pre-empted by ERISA." Id. at 42; cf Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 110203 (contending the terms of the employee health benefits plan determine the
requisite quantity and quality of benefits provided by doctors and the HMO).
92. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356-58. The court held the vicarious liability claim
cannot be characterized as any of the three causes of action available under
ERISA. Id. at 351-52 (holding "the plaintiffs' claims are not claims 'to recover
[plan] benefits due... under the terms of [the] plan, to enforce... rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify... rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan' as those phrases are used in § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B)r).
93. Id. at 356-57.
94. Id. at 356, 361. The court noted, however, that its holding could prompt
HMOs to state explicitly in the employee benefit plan that the participant would
receive medical care from high quality physicians. Id. at 358 ("We recognize the
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II. PACIFICARE OF OKLAHOMA V BURRAGE
9 5 the United States
In PacifiCareof Oklahoma v. Burrage,
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit became the first circuit
court to decide whether ERISA preempts a medical malpractice
claim based on a vicarious liability theory against an ERISAregulated managed care entity.9 6 Relying heavily on principles
developed in prior ERISA cases," the court analyzed the
vicarious liability malpractice claim in light of the "relates to"
language in ERISA's preemption clause. e
PacifiCare carefully explored the nature of the vicarious
liability malpractice claim. The court used the more inclusive
possibility that an ERISA plan may describe a benefit in terms that can
accurately be described as related to the quality of the service."). Courts would
thus be tempted to construe a malpractice claim as one "to recover benefits."
Id. The court reserved judgment on whether an employer and an HMO could
agree that a quality of health care standard articulated in the employee benefit
plan would replace applicable state tort standards and instead opt for the more
advantageous federal law of ERISA. Id. This Comment urges courts to reject
such transparent attempts by HMOs to manipulate ERISA to their advantage.
95. 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 153. One month before the Tenth Circuit decided PacifiCare,the
Third Circuit considered and issued an opinion in a similar case, but never
decided whether ERISA preempted the claim. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 361.
97. The PacifiCare court frequently cited two of its prior ERISA cases,
National Elevator Indus., Inc. v. Calhoon, 957 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992), and Airparts Co. v. Custom Benefit Serv., 28 F.3d
1062 (10th Cir. 1994), which in turn relied on reasoning from the Second, Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth circuit courts. Based upon this reasoning, PacifiCare
observed:
ERISA does not preempt "'laws of general application-not specifically
targeting ERISA plans-that involve traditional areas of state
regulation and do not affect relations among the principal ERISA
entities'.... As long as a state law does not affect the structure, the
administration, or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the
mere fact that the [law] has some economic impact on the plan does
not require that the [law] be invalidated."
59 F.3d at 154 (quoting Airparts, 28 F.3d at 1065 (quoting National Elevator,
957 F.2d at 1559)). Although PacifiCaremade these observations, it did not use
them in its analysis. Instead, the court suggested the lack of any effect on the
relations among the principal ERISA entities-the employer, the ERISA plan,
the beneficiaries, and any fiduciaries-ultimately settles the preemption
question. Id.
98. See PacifiCare,59 F.3d at 154 (holding the law "relates to" an employee
benefit plan if it has connection with or reference to the plan). PacifiCarenoted
the "tenuous, remote, or peripheral" limitation on the Shaw "relates to" test.
Id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)). The court
then examined whether the benefit plan "related to" any of the recognized four
categories of laws thereby subjecting the plan to ERISA. Id.
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phrase, vicarious liability, to refer to the ostensible agency claim
at issue in the original suit99 and categorically rejected characterization of the vicarious liability malpractice claim as a claim
for quality.' 0 The court also discarded the argument that the
claim involved the level of benefits promised by the plan.'
Instead, it accepted a characterization of the claim as directed
toward its two elements: the doctor's negligence and the agency
relationship between the doctor and the HMO. 1°2 The court
agreed with the district court finding that "reference to the plan
to resolve the agency issue does not implicate the concerns of
ERISA preemption."'
The court further held that the issue
of negligence involves an examination of the relationship
between the patient and physician, and an evaluation of whether
the physician failed to meet the proper standard of care.0 4
Following other district courts' interpretation of pertinent
ERISA language,' 5 PacifiCare concluded that "reference to"
the plan for purposes of establishing the agency relationship
between PacifiCare and its physicians does not compel preemption of the claim. 106 The court further reasoned that since
ERISA does not preempt the malpractice claim against the
plan's doctor, it should not preempt the vicarious liability
99. See Schachter v. PacifiCare of Okla., No. 94-C-203-BU, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14278, at *1, *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 16, 1995) (referring to Davidson's
physician as PacifiCare's "ostensible agent"). "Vicarious liability" denotes both
respondeat superior/actual agency and ostensible/apparent agency doctrines.
Chittenden, supra note 18, at 453. An HMO is liable under the respondeat
superior theory if it employed the negligent physician. Id. at 454. The
employer-employee relationship implies that the HMO exercises actual control
over the physician. Id. at 454-56. "Where no employment relationship exists,
however, vicarious liability may still attach to the [HMO]... under the doctrine
of 'ostensible agency.'" Id. at 458.
100. 59 F.3d at 155. PacifiCarereacted to the district court's reasoning in
Dukes v. United States Health Care Systems that ERISA preempts vicarious
liability malpractice claims because of the claim questions whether the actual
benefits received measured up to those outlined in the employee benefit plan.
Id. PacifiCarepresumably rejected the "quality" construction in an attempt to
avoid the district court's per se preemption.
101. See id.(restating the observation of the district court that the claim did
not involve the level of benefits promised by the health plan).
102. See id. ('The claim alleges negligent care by the doctor and an agency
relationship between the doctor and the HMO.").
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning
of courts holding that ERISA's "relates to" language does not require preemption of ostensible agency malpractice claims brought against HMOs).
106. PacifiCare,59 F.3d at 155.
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malpractice claim against the HMO.'
According to the court,
however, the vicarious liability claim will only survive if the
HMO "held out" the doctor as its agent. 0 8 Consistent with
these findings, PacifiCare held ERISA does not preempt the
medical malpractice claim brought against the HMO and denied
the HMO's petition for a writ of mandamus.0 9
III. SOLID RESULT, SHAKY REASONING: LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PACIFICARE
CHARACTERIZATION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY CLAIMS
PacifiCareof Oklahoma v. Burrage correctly decided ERISA
does not preempt HMO medical malpractice claims based on a
vicarious liability theory."0 The decision, however, rests on a
deficient characterization of the vicarious liability malpractice
claim that emphasizes the two separate elements of the
claim"' rather than the quality of benefits received. Although
the PacifiCareconstruction of the claim is legitimate, the court's
express rejection of the "quality" standard is inconsistent with
the characterization of the vicarious liability malpractice claim
advanced by the only other circuit court to consider ERISA
preemption in this context."'
In addition, PacifiCare's approach mires the question of ERISA preemption of vicarious
liability malpractice claims in a morass of textual ambiguity."3
Future courts will need a stronger approach to ensure that
PacifiCare'sdesirable result withstands scrutiny.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. PacifiCareaffirmed the district court's decision and ruled the court
acted within its discretion when remanding the loss of consortium claim to state
court. Id. Loss of consortium claims maybe based on vicarious liability and
fraudulent administration of a plan. Id. ERISA preempts loss of consortium
claims based upon fraud. Id. The district court, therefore, correctly concluded
the plaintiffs loss of consortium claim was not preempted by ERISA to the
extent that the claim was based on vicarious liability. Id.
110. 59 F.3d at 155.
111. The elements of an ostensible agency malpractice claim are the doctor's
negligence and the parallel agency relationship between the doctor and the
HMO.
See supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing PacifiCare's
articulation of the ostensible agency claim).
112. See supra notes 92-94 (discussing the Third Circuit's characterization
of the vicarious liability claim as one attacking the quality of received benefits
in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc.).
113. PacifiCare'sreliance on the text of ERISA is a departure from the
current trend in ERISA preemption jurisprudence. See supra note 68
(discussing the Supreme Court's recent approach to ERISA preemption).
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A. PACIFICARE's SOLID RESULT: LOOSENING ERISA's
PREEMPTiVE GRIP

PacifiCare properly ruled that ERISA does not preempt
ostensible agency malpractice claims brought against HMOs,
thereby checking ERISA's largely unrestrained preemption
power. Past courts relied heavily on the text of ERISA's
preemption clause and ignored the policy behind ERISA, thereby
denying injured plaintiffs judicial remedy."4
Given that
ERISA's goal is to protect employee-benefit-plan beneficiaries
from injury, Congress certainly could not have intended such an
absurd result. In addition, the Supreme Court"5 and various
district courts 116 have experienced difficulty in assigning
boundaries to ERISA preemption. PacifiCare'snarrow holding
quells some of this judicial confusion and may resolve the
district court split. By restraining ERISA preemption of indirect
medical malpractice claims, PacifiCareavoids the absurd result
reached by earlier courts and offers injured patients an avenue
to bring these claims against their HMOs.
B. PACIFICARE'S SHAKY REASONING: SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
PACIFICARE APPROACH

1. Legal Paradox and the Loss of Quality
In resolving the inconsistency among district court holdings,
PacifiCareironically adopts an inconsistent approach of its own
that creates a troubling legal paradox. In its "complete preemption" inquiry, the Third Circuit in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,Inc.,
characterized the ostensible agency malpractice claim against
the HMO as a claim touching upon the quality of medical
services received." ' PacifiCare,however, discards this "quality"
construction in its ERISA preemption analysis." 8 In doing so,
114. See supra notes 68, 72 (noting the Supreme Court's early loyalty to
ERISA's text); supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the injurious
results in "direct negligence" cases, in which federal courts held that ERISA
preempted medical malpractice actions because they 'relate to" the employee
benefit plan).
115. See supra note 66 (discussing the Supreme Court's inconsistent
approach to ERISA preemption cases).
116. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (describing the district
court split over the issue of ERISA preemption of HMO vicarious liability
malpractice claims).
117. See supra notes 92-94.
118. PacifiCare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995).
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PacifiCare creates a legal paradox: an ostensible agency
malpractice claim is a claim attacking quality for purposes of
ERISA "complete preemption" but not for purposes of ERISA
preemption.
This paradox could jeopardize the fate of future ERISA
preemption challenges to ostensible agency malpractice claims.
In ERISA litigation, a challenged state common law claim
generally must survive both complete preemption under ERISA
§ 502(a) and federal preemption under ERISA § 514 (ERISA
preemption)." 9 Under Dukes, vicarious liability malpractice
claims escape complete preemption because such claims merely
attack the quality of benefits received 2 and federal district
courts must thus remand the claims to state courts.' 2 '
Charged with deciding the federal preemption issue, state courts
face the difficult task of reconciling the federal court's "quality"
characterization of the malpractice claim and the PacifiCare
legal paradox.
State courts, looking to federal courts for guidance on
whether ERISA preempts claims attacking the quality of
benefits, must turn to PacifiCare.22 By rejecting the "quality"
construction of the vicarious liability malpractice claim,
PacifiCare arguably concluded that ERISA preempts claims
concerning quality of benefits. Consequently, state courts are
left with an inadvertent presumption for ERISA preemption of
HMO ostensible agency malpractice claims, a result contrary to

119. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (explaining that federal
courts must first determine whether they have removal jurisdiction to hear the
claim before reaching the merits of the preemption issue). The federal district
court in PacifiCare had supplemental jurisdiction over the ostensible agency
claim and, therefore, it did not need to engage in the "complete preemption"
inquiry for removal jurisdiction. See supra note 11 and accompanying text
(explaining how the court retained jurisdiction over the ostensible agency claim
in PacifiCare).
120. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 564 (1995). See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Dukes' rationale that a challenge to the quality of received benefits is entirely
separate from a challenge for benefits not received).
121. See supra notes 54-58 (discussing how the applicability of complete
preemption determines whether federal courts can exercise removal jurisdiction).
122. See supra text accompanying note 19 (observing that PacifiCareis the
first circuit court to rule on the preemption issue); cf Pampas v. United States
Healthcare Sys., No. 02617, 1996 WL 112981, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 15,
1996) (turning to the Third Circuit courts for guidance on whether ERISA
preempts a malpractice claim based on ostensible agency theory).
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PacifiCare'sholding.1
Admittedly, state courts may interpret PacifiCare'srejection
of the "quality" construction as a strategy to save the malpractice claim from ERISA preemption. 124 By refusing to include
quality in its characterization of the claim, however, PacifiCare
indirectly reinforces the reasoning of district courts that hold
ERISA preempts vicarious liability medical malpractice
claims. 125 In fact, PacifiCare supported this misguided notion
district court ruling that gave rise to
despite a reversal of the
126
this line of reasoning.
Furthermore, the PacifiCarecourt's strategy is unnecessary.
The characterization of a medical malpractice claim as a state
common law form of quality control can withstand a preemption
challenge. States have traditionally had exclusive authority over
the field of quality control. 27 Absent an explicit congressional
mandate to the contrary, courts have held that states will
continue to have exclusive power to regulate quality.1 28 In
addition, ERISA does not preempt laws that may have an
indirect economic effect on the plan.1 29 Common law aimed at
quality control of health care, like other state quality control
regulation, indirectly affects the relative cost of providing
medical services to HMO enrollees.' 3° Hence, ERISA does not

123. It is uncertain how state courts will rule on this issue.
124. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing PacifiCare's
reliance on a district court's reasoning that ERISA preempts claims for quality,
leading to the court's rejection of the quality standard).
125. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (noting that district
courts mandated preemption because ostensible agency malpractice claims
merely assert the denial of the benefit plans' promised quality, which arguably
constitute claims for denied benefits).
126. District courts attribute the promised quality line ofreasoning to Dukes
v. United States Healthcare Systems, 848 F. Supp. 39,42 (E.D. Pa. 1994), which
was subsequently reversed and remanded by the Third Circuit. Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 564 (1995).
127. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 357 (citing New York State Conf. of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1678-79 (1995)).
128. "Quality control of benefits, such as the health care benefits provided
here, is a field traditionally occupied by state regulation and we interpret the
silence of Congress as reflecting an intent that it remain such." Id.
129. Travelers Ins., 115 S.Ct. at 1679; see supra note 68 (noting federal
district court use of this limitation on ERISA preemption).
130. Travelers Ins., 115 S. Ct. at 1679 (noting that even though quality
control regulation has some indirect economic effect, if ERISA preemption were
interpreted to displace all state laws that affect costs, it would effectively
eliminate any limitation on ERISA preemption, thus violating basic principles
of statutory interpretation).
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preempt quality control common law.
2. Back to "Relate To": The Ambiguity of ERISA's
Preemption Clause
PacifiCare expresses a willingness to be bound by the
Supreme Court's early textual approach used in ERISA preemption cases. 3 ' The Supreme Court's broad reading of ERISA's
preemption clause created uncertainty over the extent to which
a state law has to make "reference to" or have a "connection
13 2
with" an ERISA plan in order to trigger preemption.
PacifiCare'sapproach produces a similar ambiguity.
In PacifiCare,the central issue was whether "reference to"
the plan to establish an agency relationship between the doctor
and the HMO was sufficient to warrant preemption.'3 3 While
determining that the reference was insufficient, PacifiCare
unfortunately failed to provide the threshold level of "reference
to a[n] ERISA plan" that is required to trigger ERISA preemption.'34 The court simply states "any reference to the plan to
resolve that issue [of the agency relationship] does not implicate
the concerns of ERISA preemption." 35 Much like the Supreme
Court,'3 6 PacifiCare found it difficult to overcome the "relate
to" hurdle.
Moreover, PacifiCare'sstrict reliance on ERISA's ambiguous
text weakens its reasoning. Injured plaintiffs could argue that
reference to the plan to establish the agency relationship is
insignificant or, at most, "indirect."'3 7 Some courts, however,
have already ruled that such reference is sufficient for pre-

131. See supra notes 67, 71 (noting the Supreme Court's early loyalty to
ERISA's text).
132. TravelersIns., 115 S. Ct. at 1677 (recognizing that attempts to construe
the "relate to" language have not helped the Supreme Court to delineate the
boundaries of ERISA preemption).
133. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing PacifiCare's
analysis).
134. See supranotes 67-68 and accompanying text (referring to the Supreme
Court's test for preemption under Shaw).
135. PacifiCare of Okla. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis added).
136. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's inability to offer further guidance on the "relate to" text).
137. See supra notes 68, 130 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
court limitation on the broad reading of ERISA's preemption clause).
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emption. 33 Hence, the debate deteriorates into a textualist
stalemate.
With the enormous growth in ERISA litigation, federal
courts should be attempting to diffuse such stalemates by
moving beyond the unhelpful text." 9
Unfortunately,
PacifiCare rests on the problematic text of the statute despite
the Supreme Court's recent movement away from textual
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause toward examination
of Congress's overall objective in enacting ERISA. 4 ° Accordingly, PacifiCare should have bolstered its reasoning by noting
ERISA's purpose and the presumption against preemption.
By failing to fill in the gaps in ERISA's broad statutory
preemption mandate,' PacifiCare did not fully assume its
judicial role.
Congress clearly intended federal common law
to act as a check on ERISA preemption.'
In this respect,
PacifiCareproperly ruled that ERISA did not preempt ostensible
agency malpractice claims brought against HMOs, thereby
checking ERISA's largely unrestrained preemption power.
PacifiCare, however, widened the gaps in ERISA preemption
jurisprudence by creating an untenable legal paradox over
quality and stubbornly relying solely on the text of ERISA's
preemption clause. These serious deficiencies in PacifiCare's
characterization of the ostensible agency claim and overall
approach weaken its holding against future attacks by HMOs.
C.

BROADENING THE BASE: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO

ERISA PREEMPTION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS
To avoid the problems that plagued PacifiCare, courts

138. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (reasoning that agency claims
were made pursuant to the employee health care plan).
139. New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
140. See supra notes 70-72 (discussing the Supreme Court's shift in
analysis).
141. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 48, § 6.3.1 (noting that the aim behind the
creation of federal common law was to develop specific rules or standards to fill
in "the gaps" of federal statutes, especially when "common law is needed to
fulfill Congress's purposes in adopting a particular statute").
142. See supranote 79 and accompanying text (discussing one commentator's
criticism over the Supreme Court's "abdication of judicial law-creating
authority" in the face of ERISA preemption).
143. See supra note 47 (noting the Supreme Court's finding of Congress's
intent in the legislative history).
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should adopt an approach effectuating ERISA's primary
objectives, giving greater weight to the presumption against
preemption canon, and recognizing important public policy
concerns such as equity and quality. When in doubt whether a
particular state common law malpractice claim triggers ERISA
preemption, courts should follow a three-prong approach to
resolve the issue. Courts should first determine which result,
preemption or nonpreemption, would frustrate the policy behind
ERISA's enactment. Courts should then examine the claim
within a presumption against preemption framework. Finally,
courts should consider principles of equity and quality in their
analysis.
1. Effectuating Congress's Primary Objectives
Recent debates over ERISA's effectiveness in eliminating
conflicting regulations have masked ERISA's primary purpose."M Although Congress intended ERISA to create uniformity in the field of employee benefit plans,. 45 Congress's
primary purpose in enacting ERISA was to protect employees.
Accordingly, the alternative approach should preserve for
employees the traditional opportunity to redress their injuries:
the state common law claim of medical malpractice. Congress
could not have intended to deny state tort remedies to employeeparticipants of HMO health care plans. Such a result would
frustrate the overall objective to protect employees and beneficiaries.
Moreover, nonpreemption of vicarious liability malpractice
claims conforms with Congress's ancillary purpose of creating
administrative uniformity.'46 Laws that do not affect HMOs'
administrative practices or procedures do not compromise HMO
Vicarious liability malpractice
administrative integrity.'4 7
claims do not infringe upon HMOs' administrative procedures
such as utilization review/cost-containment, benefit eligibility
decision making and processing, or calculation of benefit

144. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
behind ERISA's enactment).
145. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting the purpose behind
ERISA's preemption clause).
146. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale
behind ERISA's preemption clause's goal of uniformity).
147. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 10 (1987).
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levels.148 Accordingly, these malpractice claims do not interfere with ERISA's goal of administrative uniformity for health
plans.
Contrary to the view taken by some,'49 ERISA's goal of
uniformity was not designed to protect employers, employee
benefit plans, or plan fiduciaries. 150 In fact, ERISA bestowed
the advantages of federal uniformity to ensure that employers
and employee benefit plans would not offset their administrative
costs onto vulnerable employee beneficiaries and their dependents.' 5' Regulatory uniformity was the means to achieve the
desired end of protecting employees. Given ERISA's purpose,
HMOs should not receive ERISA's solicitude; any special benefits
arising from ERISA's regulatory control should be conferred to
the employee-participants of health care plans, not the ERISAregulated HMO plan. Preemption of malpractice claims would
give HMOs a protective benefit that disrupts ERISA's intended
balanced protection.'5 2
2. Adopting a Presumption Against Preemption
In light of the federalism interest underlying the presumption against preemption, the presumption's operation in the
preemption analysis of a state HMO vicarious liability malpractice claim is particularly appropriate. According to the presumption against preemption canon, federal law should not intrude
upon areas historically left to the states."'
Indeed, ERISA
preemption "must be guided by respect for the separate spheres

148. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, § 6-2, at 237 (discussing HMOs'
administrative duties with regard to the employee health care benefit plan).
149. See Samborn, supra note 73, at A26 (discussing the views of ERISA
supporters who suggest that by creating uniformity, ERISA has successfully
met its mandate).
150. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing the policy
behind ERISA's enactment). Admittedly, ERISA sought to strike a balance
between protecting participants and encouraging employers to provide employee
benefit plans. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (citing ERISA's
legislative history). Even the goal of encouraging employee benefit plans,
however, benefits employees not employers.
151. Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 10 (stating that nonuniform
regulations might produce administrative inefficiencies, which the employer
might choose to compensate for by lowering benefit levels).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39 (discussing Congress's desire
to balance employee protection with the interest in benefit plan formation by
employers).
153. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the
presumption against preemption canon).
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of government authority preserved in our federalist system." 54
States have long prescribed health and medical professional
liability standards.'5 5 Moreover, medical malpractice claims
protect the public's health and safety, a task belonging to the
states under their police power. 5 ' By allowing ERISA to
preempt malpractice claims, courts leave states bereft of their
traditional power to regulate in this area. Future courts must
give the presumption of preemption canon its proper weight and
curb ERISA's preemptive encroachment on the historically stateregulated domain of medical malpractice. Indeed, refusal to
extend ERISA preemption to HMO vicarious liability malpractice
claims deftly forestalls the elimination of an entire field of state
law claims.' 57
3. Advancing Equity and Quality in a Changing Health Care
System
Willing hostages of ERISA preemption, federal courts have
already disallowed direct negligence medical malpractice claims
against ERISA-regulated HMOs.'
Further extension of
ERISA preemption to indirect negligence claims, such as
ostensible agency claims, would functionally immunize HMOs
from any such tort liability.'59 In fact, HMOs would be free of
both tort claims and ERISA causes of action. 6 ° Considering

154. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (quoting Alessi
v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981)).
155. "[Sitate law has traditionally prescribed the standards of professional
liability .... " Painters of Phila. Dist. Council No.21 Welfare Fund v. Price
Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146, 1152 (3d Cir. 1989). "Thus, we conclude that
ERISA does not generally preempt state professional malpractice actions." Id.
at 1152 n.7.
156. See supra note 64 (noting state police power over matters of health and
safety).
157. Congress was silent with regard to ERISA preemption of the medical
malpractice field despite its prominence in state common law when ERISA was
enacted. See generally H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. 4639 (not mentioning malpractice claims of any kind with
regard to ERISA preemption).
158. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the Corcoran,
Kuhl, and Kohn cases).
159. ERISA preemption already functionally immunizes HMOs because of
HMOs' role in administering health benefit plans. See supra note 45
(discussing Congress's desire to provide a uniform set of administrative
procedures for health care systems).
160. To bring an ERISA cause of action, the claim must fall within ERISA's
civil enforcement scheme. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing
the causes of action available under ERISA). Under Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare,
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the public interest in equity and the changing role of HMOs in
health care, the alternative approach appropriately withholds
this functional immunity from HlIOs.
Holding other health care providers accountable to state
laws16 ' but relieving ERISA-regulated HMOs of the same
obligation is inherently inequitable. If liMOs choose to enter the
field of health care provision, then they should remain susceptible to the same tort liability under ostensible agency theory as
other large health care providers. Moreover, eliminating HMOs'
current protected status would not render them completely
defenseless.'6 2 Indeed, potential exposure to tort liability is an
incentive to institute preventive measures as an alternative to
blanket immunity.
HMO immunity from ostensible agency claims appears even
more misplaced when considering the HMOs' changing role in
the health care system. The health care system has witnessed
a "diffusion of power" from physicians to HMOs and hospitals. 163 Changes in medical decision making authority have
accompanied this shift in power.'6 Physicians traditionally
enjoyed undisturbed autonomy in supervising patient medical
care, but in the race to control costs, HMOs have taken over a
large amount of medical treatment decision making from
doctors. 6 5 If HMOs want to control certain aspects of medical
care, they should be exposed to liability for malpractice; HMOs
must share in the liability implications that accompany decisionmaking authority. In other words, HMOs should not be allowed
to leave physicians carrying the brunt of the liability.
Moreover, if HMOs will play a truly major role in health
care reform, the quality guarantees inherent in tort liability
must remain alongside cost-cutting strategies. Medical malpractice claims are a method of quality control. 66 The alternative

an ostensible agency malpractice claim does not fall within ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing
the Third Circuit's holding in Dukes).
161. See Chittenden, supra note 18, at 453-65 (noting that hospitals have
long been subject to ostensible agency liability).
162. See Chittenden, supra note 18, at 465-68 (discussing various preventive
measures HMOs can use to protect themselves from vicarious liability).
163. See Frankel, supra note 22, at 1320.
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 22-29 (discussing HMOs' role in cost containment).
166. See supra note 78 (discussing the role of medical malpractice in
promoting quality within the health care system).
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approach preserves an essential form of medical quality control
at a time when cost, access, and quality issues remain at the
cornerstone of health care reform.
D. PACIFICARE UNDER THE BROAD-BASED APPROACH
Application of the alternative approach to PacifiCareyields
the same result as the court's approach: nonpreemption of the
vicarious liability medical malpractice claim. Barbara Jean
Davidson's surviving children would have had the opportunity to
litigate their malpractice case in state court. The court would
have best effectuated ERISA's primary purpose of protecting
employees by allowing them an opportunity to redress their
injury in state court for monetary damages. By reading the
preemption clause narrowly and noting the states' traditional
regulation in the field under the presumption against preemption canon, the court would have found against preemption of
the vicarious liability malpractice claim. The court's holding
would be justified considering the importance of equity between
HMOs and other health care providers and quality control
through tort liability.
As precedent, the broad-based approach would provide
future courts with a stronger foundation upon which to rest their
holdings. The approach remedies the deficiencies in the
PacifiCarecourt's reasoning. It accommodates both the "quality"
standard and the PacifiCarecharacterizations of the ostensible
agency claim, thereby eliminating any inconsistency and
highlighting the strengths of the courts' approaches. Following
the current trend in ERISA preemption jurisprudence, the
broad-based approach diffuses the ability of HMOs to carve out
exceptions for themselves within the preemption clause's
problematic text. Most importantly, this approach limits ERISA
preemption and gives injured plaintiffs recourse against HMOs
for the negligence of their agent physicians, a result compatible
with ERISA's purpose.
Unfortunately, even the broad-based approach may not
prevent ERISA preemption of utilization review malpractice
claims.' 67 Utilization review is an integral part of HMO
administrative structure. 68 ERISA mandates noninterference

167. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing utilization review
cases).
168. See supra note 27 (discussing utilization review management).
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with administrative standards set up by the employee benefit
plan.'6 9 Sadly, the personal tragedies associated with negligent
HMO utilization review decisions echo those of the testi-mony
that initially led to ERISA's enactment."0 ERISA's drafters
never contemplated these ironies. Hence, if courts are unable to
prevent such an absurd result, the only remedy may lie in
legislative, rather than judicial, action.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts interpreting ERISA's preemption structure
have deprived injured employee-beneficiaries of their state
common law malpractice claims against HMO-sponsored health
plans. In PacifiCareof Oklahoma v. Burrage,the Tenth Circuit
reexamined ERISA preemption with regard to a medical
malpractice claim based on ostensible agency. Although the
court correctly held that ERISA did not preempt HMO malpractice claims based on a vicarious liability theory, it offered a weak
approach that compounds the inconsistency and frustration
already plaguing courts faced with increasing ERISA preemption
litigation.
In response to PacifiCare,courts should adopt a broad-based
approach that is more consistent with ERISA's purpose and
gives proper regard to the presumption against preemption and
traditional state powers. The reduction of HMOs' present
blanket immunity and the promotion of quality in our changing
health care justify the broad-based approach to ERISA preemption. This alternative approach ensures the survival of
medical malpractice claims based on ostensible agency and
should serve as a model for limiting ERISA preemption of other
HMO medical malpractice claims.

169. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's
intention to provide regulatory uniformity to increase efficiency thus easing the
overall administrative burden).
170. See supra note 36 (recounting stories presented to congressional
committees); supra note 79 (recounting the facts which gave rise to the
utilization review suits).

